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State-sponsored Pensions for Private Sector Workers:  
The Case for Pooled Annuities and Tontines 
 
This paper explains how state governments could create new low-cost lifetime assurance 
funds to help provide retirement income security for millions of private-sector workers who 
currently lack pension coverage and how these governments could do so with minimal risk. An 
assurance fund operates like a mutual fund held within a defined contribution (DC) plan, but with 
the added features of mortality pooling and fully-funded lifetime payouts. As we envision them, 
assurance funds would be offered as annuity-like investment options on the new investment 
platforms being created by states like Oregon, California, and Maryland that offer their citizens 
the opportunity to participate in state-sponsored retirement savings plans (see, e.g., Pension Rights 
Center 2020; AARP Public Policy Institute 2020). Adding an assurance fund could effectively turn 
these retirement savings plans into lifetime pensions. Participants in these state-sponsored 
pensions could allocate their contributions between regular mutual funds and these new assurance 
funds, and, in partnership with various private-sector investment and record-keeping companies, 
the state-sponsored pension would manage and invest those designated contributions and make the 
appropriate payouts to retirees and their beneficiaries. 
To ensure their sustainability, assurance funds would operate as either tontines or pooled 
annuities—sometimes referred to as participating annuities.1 The term ‘assurance’ is used to 
differentiate these products from ‘insurance’ products, in that while they do pool longevity risk, 
they are not based in any way on the principle of indemnity or a contract of risk transfer. Like 
commercial annuities, assurance funds would provide lifetime income, but unlike commercial 
annuities, assurance funds would not guarantee a precise level of that income. Instead, assurance 
funds would adhere to a strict budget constraint that requires them to remain fully funded at all 
times.2 As a result, assurance fund payouts would vary as necessary to ensure their sustainability. 
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Not only would assurance funds be sustainable, they would also be efficient.3 In particular, 
assurance fund payouts would be significantly higher than payouts from traditional mutual funds. 
This follows naturally from the fact that assurance funds rely on the survivor principle—that the 
share of each participant, at death, is enjoyed by the surviving participants, resulting in higher 
payouts to survivors for as long as they live. Additionally, assurance funds should enjoy higher 
average payout rates than comparable commercial annuities, because assurance funds would have 
no need for reserves and would do away with the expense of compensating insurance companies 
for taking on any risk. 
In a world with substantial levels of undersaving, economic efficiency is vital. Moreover, 
underfunding is a slippery slope, because once a hole develops, there is always a chance that it 
could grow deeper, and deeper holes are increasingly difficult to escape. Truly sustainable 
solutions must always remain fully funded, because to tolerate underfunding is to invite 
sustainability risk. Assurance fund income would not be fixed, and it would not be guaranteed. 
Rather, it would be variable and nonguaranteed. But it would always be fully funded and, therefore, 
fully sustainable … forever. 
The useful properties of assurance funds extend beyond state-sponsored pensions in the 
United States. Indeed, the assurance-fund model could extend to other countries and to private-
sector retirement plans, as well. For example, a country like Chile, which has a well-established 
annuity market, could include assurance funds in its universal DC pension system to provide its 
citizens a flexible alternative to the current choices of traditional programmed withdrawals or 
traditional annuities (OECD 2019a). A country like Colombia, which lacks a deep annuity market 
due to policies that discourage private insurers from participating, might introduce assurance funds 
as a relatively fast, low-cost alternative to developing an annuity market (OECD 2015). 




Lifetime Assurance Funds 
A lifetime assurance fund is essentially a DC pension plan designed to pay out what it 
can—no more and no less—in an objective manner that is fully disclosed to all participants. 
Economically, an assurance fund always abides by a strict budget constraint, in that the expected 
present value of the payouts must always equal the present value of the fund’s assets. An assurance 
fund can do this because it relies on the principle of mortality risk pooling, and, assuming that the 
pool of investors is large enough, the assurance fund is able to discount future payouts by the 
probability that the pool’s members will be alive to receive those payouts. The budget constraint 
effectively means that assurance funds are always grounded in economic reality, which we believe 
makes them an attractive option for states and retirees alike. 
Through an assurance fund pool, members diversify and share longevity risk among 
themselves. The investment balance of each investor is accounted for individually and reflects 
actual market values.4 Participants in a retirement plan that offers assurance funds may make their 
own investment decisions within the set of assurance funds provided by the plan administrator, 
and their accounts are credited with their investment returns as usual. That is, a given retirement 
plan might offer a few different assurance funds in the same way that it offers a few different 
traditional mutual funds. In fact, these same mutual funds could serve as the underlying 
investments used by the assurance funds. For example, if a plan offered five different mutual funds 
as investment choices, it could elect to offer the same five investment choices as assurance funds.5 
Contributions to these assurance funds would be irrevocable in order to enforce the 
condition that the risk-sharing arrangement is for life. In return, investors would receive mortality 
credits for as long as they live: living investors would divide the assets in the accounts of the 
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investors that die. These mortality credits would be in addition to the investment returns on the 
underlying investment assets. As we envision them, the payouts from assurance funds would vary 
over time to ensure that the actuarial expected value of each investor’s future lifetime payouts 
always matches the current value of her account balance. In short, the payouts from assurance 
funds will vary according to investment performance and mortality experience, because those are 
the two factors that affect the investor’s balance. 
Assurance funds compared to traditional mutual funds. Assurance fund payouts would be 
higher than the amounts that could be safely withdrawn from traditional mutual funds. The reason 
is that assurance funds offer not only investment returns, but also mortality credits. The return 
advantage to long-lived survivors would be especially significant because, as we will show, 
mortality credits would increase significantly with age. 
Investments in assurance funds would differ in a major way from investments in mutual 
funds in that an investor in an assurance fund would never be allowed to withdraw her 
contributions (or her investment earnings or mortality credits). The situation is identical to a 
commercial life annuity: once the premium is paid, there is no refund. Instead, a participant in an 
assurance fund would only receive payouts according to the lifetime-payout method that she 
elected. For example, a typical participant in an assurance fund could elect to receive relatively 
level monthly payments starting at her planned retirement age—say, age 65 (if she is alive then)—
until her death. Alternatively, she could elect escalating payouts (say, to offset inflation) that would 
start lower (at age 65) but would end up much higher, the longer she survives. Either way, the 
payouts to survivors from an assurance fund would be significantly higher than the payouts from 
a regular investment due to the mortality credits. 
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Assurance funds compared to traditional life annuities. Assurance fund payouts should also be 
higher than the payouts from a commercial life annuity. Assurance fund payouts would follow 
directly from: 1) the investment returns on the underlying investment portfolio; 2) the mortality 
experience of the assurance fund pool; and 3) the payout method that a member elects, which could 
be designed to be level or escalating. Because the assurance fund sponsor would make no 
guarantees, it would only charge a trivial fee to administer the program; and no money would ever 
need to be set aside for insurance company reserves or risk-taking. All in all, assurance fund 
payouts would mimic the high payouts that would come from being able to buy an actuarially-fair 
variable income annuity (VIA), which by some estimates could be 10 or 15 percent higher than 
what a typical commercial life annuity would pay.6 
 
Tontines and Pooled Annuities 
As mentioned, assurance funds would be structured as either tontines or pooled annuities. 
This section explains how simple tontines work and then goes on to show how an assurance fund 
could be engineered as a tontine or pooled annuity. 
A simple tontine. In the simplest type of tontine, a set of investors contributes equally to buy a 
portfolio of investments to be awarded entirely to the last surviving investor (Cooper 1972: 1−2). 
Alternatively, the balances of those who die can be divided up and redistributed to the surviving 
investors more frequently. The latter type of tontine can be used to develop new financial products 
that would provide reliable, pension-like income for retirees, like tontine annuities, tontine 
pensions, and individual tontine accounts (see, e.g., Forman and Sabin 2016; Forman and Sabin 
2015; Fullmer 2019; Fullmer and Sabin 2019a; Sabin 2010; Milevsky and Salisbury 2015; 
Goldsticker 2007; Newfield 2014). 
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At the outset, imagine that 1,000 65-year-old retirees each contributed $1,000 to an 
investment fund that purchased a $1,000,000 Treasury bond paying four percent interest coupons. 
The bond will generate $40,000 interest per year, which is split equally among the surviving 
investors of the tontine. A custodian holds the bond, and because the custodian takes no risk and 
requires no capital, the custodian charges a trivial fee. If all the investors lived through the first 
year, each would receive a $40 dividend from the fund ($40 = $40,000 / 1,000). If only 800 original 
investors were alive a decade after the tontine started (when the survivors are age 75), then each 
would receive a $50 dividend ($50 = $40,000 / 800). If only 100 were alive two decades after that 
(when the survivors are 95), then each would receive a $400 dividend ($400 = $40,000 / 100). 
Later, when only 40 remain, each would receive a $1,000 dividend ($1,000 = $40,000 / 40). If the 
terms of the tontine called for liquidation at that point, then each of the 40 survivors would also 
receive a liquidating distribution of $25,000 ($25,000 = $1,000,000 / 40). 
More advanced tontines. Most retirees would likely prefer reasonably level benefits throughout 
their retirement years, rather than benefits that increased sharply at the very end of their lives. 
Fortunately, it is possible to design tontines with payouts that are expected to remain level, on 
average, throughout retirement or, alternatively, with payouts that increase gradually throughout 
retirement, say, to offset inflation (see, e.g., Forman and Sabin 2015; Milevsky and Salisbury 
2015). 
Tontines would be of little practical interest if the way that they redistributed forfeited 
balances was not fair to all investors. A growing set of ‘fair tontine design’ articles have examined 
the ways and conditions in which tontines can indeed offer fair, equitable bets to all investors (e.g., 
Sabin 2010; Forman and Sabin 2015; Milevsky and Salisbury 2015; Donnelly et al. 2014). Indeed, 
tontines can be designed to offer fair bets for all investors even if they are of different ages, 
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genders, invest different amounts at different times, use different investment portfolios, and elect 
different types of payouts. Furthermore, and crucially, fair tontines can be open-ended and 
perpetual. The key is to redistribute forfeited balances to the survivors in a very precise manner 
that reflects each survivor’s individual account balance and probability of death. For example, 
Forman and Sabin (2015) showed how a tontine fund can fairly accommodate investors of different 
ages and account balances by deriving so-called ‘fair-transfer-plan weights.’ Tontine schemes can 
also be designed to permit investors to individualize their underlying investments and payout 
choices (Forman and Sabin 2015; Fullmer and Sabin 2019a). 
Pooled annuities. The term ‘pooled annuities’ generally refers to insurance-company annuities 
offered without any insurance company guarantees (Donnelly 2015; Piggott et al. 2005).7 Instead, 
the annuitants bear all of the risks. For example, if the annuitant population lives longer than 
projected, everyone’s payouts would go down. Like fair tontines, pooled annuities can be carefully 
designed to provide fair bets to all annuitants. 
 
Pension Sustainability Challenges 
The quest for retirement security faces significant challenges in virtually every country 
across the globe. These challenges involve both the saving/accumulation and the 
dissaving/decumulation phases of the retirement lifecycle. 
Demographics and economics. One challenge involves aging demographics in the form of 
increasing life expectancy and a lower ratio of workers to retirees. At the same time, low and even 
negative interest rates have dramatically increased the cost to finance retirement. Further, the 
uncertainty associated with longevity risk—both idiosyncratic (the diversifiable portion) and 
systematic (the non-diversifiable portion)—adds to the challenge by making the cost more 
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uncertain. Simply put, retirement is expensive, and the act of promising specific/exact retirement 
benefits is both risky and expensive. 
For this reason, it is not surprising that, despite the advantage of mortality risk pooling, 
economies of scale, and professional management, many defined benefit pension (DB) plans have 
disappeared, while many of those that remain are significantly underfunded (Forman 2020). 
Indeed, private-sector DB plans in the United States were underfunded by $401.3 billion at the end 
of the first quarter of 2020, at which time the plans were 89 percent funded, while state and local 
US government pension plans were underfunded by $4.9 trillion and were just 45 percent funded 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2020). Other analysts using different data 
sources offer different estimates of public plan funding status, but generally agree that such plans 
are significantly underfunded in the aggregate (see, e.g., Aubry et al. 2018). 
The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans. DB pension promises create 
liabilities that must be hedged or otherwise reserved against. The cost of this liability management 
ultimately reduces the amount that could otherwise be paid out to pensioners. One response to 
these costs and risks has been to shift the burden of retirement funding from institutions to 
individuals—largely by replacing DB plans with DC plans (see, e.g., Staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation 2016; Mackenzie 2010; Zelinsky 2004). 
This shift towards DC plans, of course, presents other challenges. One significant issue is 
that DC plans in the United States and many other countries operate primarily as tax-advantaged 
savings vehicles rather than lifetime income vehicles (Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
2019). Also, unlike DB plans, DC plans usually make distributions as lump sum or periodic 
distributions rather than as lifetime pensions. Unfortunately, most individuals lack the financial 
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literacy, acumen, and skills to effectively manage the drawdown of retirement savings over their 
highly uncertain lifespans (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). 
While it is true that individuals may elect to convert a portion of their savings into lifetime 
income by purchasing commercial life annuities, this is only true for those who live in countries 
in which life annuities are available in good supply. Yet even in countries with well-developed 
annuity markets, a demand problem often still exists, in that people rarely choose to buy annuities 
voluntarily (American Academy of Actuaries 2015). This is true even though annuitization would 
appear to be in the best economic interest of most people. Economists refer to this as the ‘annuity 
puzzle’ (Benartzi et al. 2011). Accordingly, many retirees within a DC system forgo any form of 
longevity protection and instead take their chances that they will not outlive their assets. 
Inadequate access is another problem. Large segments of the population—for example, 
those that work in the informal economy or otherwise for small employers that do not provide 
retirement plan benefits—lack access to convenient ways to save efficiently and adequately. For 
example, as of March of 2019, just 71 percent of US private-sector workers had access to 
employer-sponsored pension plans, and only 56 percent of US private-sector workers participated 
(US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019). The probability of pension coverage 
is greater for older workers, for whites, for highly educated workers, for full-time workers, for 
higher-income workers, and for workers at larger firms (Copeland 2014). Participation in IRAs is 
even lower than participation in pensions; for example, while 36 percent of US households had an 
IRA in mid-2019, only around 12 percent of households made contributions to their IRAs in 2018 
(Holden and Schrass 2019). 
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The Role for State-sponsored DC Pensions 
Ultimately, the risk of failure for retirees in the DC system may fall on society (and largely, 
on governments). It is in everyone’s interest, therefore, to ensure that the retirement system 
functions efficiently. To that end we note that commercial life annuities have some of the same 
problems mentioned above regarding DB pensions, namely, guaranteeing a specific amount of 
income creates liabilities for the guarantor that must be hedged and reserved. Those guarantees 
can be achieved only at a cost, and that cost reduces the benefits that can be paid out to annuitants. 
Assurance funds represent a low-cost alternative that can benefit states by providing them 
with an economically efficient way to provide retiring workers with universal access to pension-
like lifetime income. Moreover, states would benefit in that assurance funds would be sustainable 
in perpetuity because they would never risk underfunding. Of course, a prerequisite is to ensure 
that workers have access to a retirement savings system in the first place, and states are 
increasingly taking a role in providing that access. 
Expanding coverage with universal pensions. To expand pension coverage, many countries 
have established universal pensions—or at least universal retirement savings programs. Those that 
mandate participation enjoy high participation rates, while those that are voluntary naturally have 
lower participation rates (OECD 2019b). 
The United States has a voluntary pension system that is not universal (Forman and 
Mackenzie 2013). Although the US federal government has not adopted a universal pension 
system, several state governments have begun to create their own universal systems for workers 
not covered by employer-sponsored pensions (Pension Rights Center 2020; AARP Public Policy 
Institute 2020; Gale and John 2018). A general theme is to encourage individuals to save in 
individual retirement accounts through automatic payroll deduction unless workers opt out. 
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Moreover, workers who opt-out may automatically be reenrolled each year, again with the 
opportunity to opt out (i.e., automatic reenrollment). The automatic escalation of their annual 
contribution rate is also a possibility. Such automatic enrollment features will almost certainly lead 
to high participation rates and to higher levels of retirement savings (OECD 2012). Contributions 
are often invested in a sensible default investment option such as a target-date fund, unless a 
worker elects otherwise (IRC § 404(c); US Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security 
Administration 2013).8 
The Oregon retirement savings plan for private-sector workers. While several states are in the 
process of setting up state-sponsored retirement savings plans for the private-sector workers 
(Pension Rights Center 2020; AARP Public Policy Institute 2020), the state of Oregon is the 
furthest along (VanDerhei 2019). As of December of 2019, at least 54,000 Oregonians at some 
3,637 businesses were enrolled (Stites 2019). 
Oregon started its OregonSaves program in 2017 to provide a means of retirement saving 
for private-sector employees who were not eligible for an employer-sponsored plan (OregonSaves 
2020). The program requires that Oregon employers without employer-sponsored plans 
automatically enroll their employees into payroll-deduction Roth IRAs managed by OregonSaves. 
The default contribution rate is five percent, although employees can opt out. Moreover, employee 
contributions are automatically increased by one percent each year until they reach 10 percent, 
unless the employee opts out. 
OregonSaves uses a private-sector program administrator for recordkeeping and other 
functions. Investor accounts are held as Roth IRAs, so contributions made in 2020 were limited to 
$6,000 (or $7,000 for individuals over the age 50). Contributions to these Roth IRAs are not 
deductible, but investment earnings are tax-exempt and withdrawals are tax-free. The first $1,000 
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of a worker’s contributions are invested in a money market or capital preservation fund 
(OregonSaves 2020). Further contributions are automatically invested in a target-date fund. 
OregonSaves also offers a growth fund alternative. OregonSaves charges an annual asset-based 
fee of around one percent to pay for the administration of the program and the operating expenses 
charged by the underlying investment funds. This fee is quite high although perhaps not 
surprisingly given that the program is so new and has not yet achieved significant economies of 
scale. Presumably, the fee level will drop significantly as the program continues to grow. 
From universal savings accounts to universal pensions. While expanded access to retirement 
savings plans is certainly helpful, these state-sponsored plans often lack a mechanism to turn 
retirement savings into lifetime retirement income. Thus, they act more like universal savings 
accounts than universal pensions. While individuals might use a portion of their savings to 
purchase commercial life annuities in the open market, there is reason to doubt that they would for 
the annuity-puzzle reasons already mentioned. There is also reason to doubt that individuals would 
voluntarily purchase annuities even if states were to make them available within their state-
sponsored plans. 
Still, individuals might be more willing to annuitize if they could do so at lower cost, with 
greater transparency, and with more investment choices; and that is exactly what assurance funds 
could provide. The trade-off for lower cost would be that assurance-fund payouts would not be 
guaranteed but would instead vary over time—with investment and mortality experience—in a 
way that would always ensure that the assurance fund is fully funded and that payouts would be 
made over the lifetimes of all participants. In short, lifetime income would be assured but not 
insured. 
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The Management and Operation of a State Assurance Fund 
Each state’s assurance-fund operation could look a lot like today’s state-run 529 
educational savings plans. In Oklahoma, for example, the state has contracted with a subsidiary of 
TIAA to be the Oklahoma 529 College Savings Plan manager, and the plan offers participants a 
choice of nine different TIAA investment options that vary in their investment strategy and degree 
of risk (Oklahoma 529 College Savings Plan 2019). Of course, there is no reason why a state-
sponsored pension could not separately contract for record-keeping and investment-fund 
management services (e.g., to select the best investment managers for each type of assurance fund). 
Noting that a number of the Oklahoma 529 College Savings Plan funds are offered with 
fees of just 30 basis points, we anticipate that state-sponsored assurance funds could likewise be 
offered at a fee of as low as 30 basis points, consisting of around 10 basis points in fund 
management fees for assets managed passively and about 20 basis points for other administrative 
expenses (Forman and Sabin 2015). 
Example. Suppose that a state opens a state-sponsored pension plan with the following features 
and options, which we simplify for the sake of brevity. Accounts are opened for new enrollees in 
the form of individual retirement accounts (IRAs). Employers lacking qualified retirement plans 
would be required to offer these IRAs to their employees via payroll deduction. Any employees 
not covered by an employer-sponsored plan would be automatically enrolled in the state-sponsored 
pension.9 Employee contributions are automatically invested in the state-sponsored pension’s 
default investment option at a default contribution rate, although employees may opt out, elect a 
different investment option, and elect a different contribution rate at any time. For simplicity, 
assume that the state-sponsored pension offered three low-cost diversified investment options: a 
global equity fund, an investment-grade bond fund, and a set of diversified target-date funds (the 
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default option). For clarity, let us refer to participant balances in these investments as ‘regular’ 
accounts, to differentiate them from balances they may hold in ‘assurance fund’ accounts, 
discussed next. 
To give participants the option to receive payouts in the form of a lifetime pension, the 
state could offer assurance funds as an additional investment option. Although contributions are 
defaulted into a regular investment account, participants have the option to instead direct any 
portion of their contributions into an assurance fund.10 Similarly, they may transfer any portion of 
their regular account balances into an assurance fund at any time. 
Contributions to assurance funds may be directed into any of the three low-cost investment 
options available in the regular investment accounts. In the simplest case, monthly payouts from 
the assurance fund would begin at age 65. Participants would have a choice about whether their 
payout stream included a growth factor, i.e., whether their payouts mimic a uniform level-payment 
annuity or an escalating annuity. 
Some participants might want to invest in an assurance fund from the very start of their 
careers, so that they could begin receiving (and compounding) mortality credits earlier, and 
consequently, end up with larger retirement accounts balances. Others might instead prefer to wait 
until closer to retirement before deciding to invest in an assurance fund. This latter approach would 
sacrifice some mortality credits and account growth, but it would leave participants with the option 
to bequeath funds if they were to die before retirement. 
 
A Simple Illustration 
Suppose that a hypothetical worker elects to begin making retirement account contributions 
to the global equity fund starting on his 35th birthday, and this fund’s expected return net of fees is 
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seven percent per year. His salary at age 35 is $50,000 a year, and it increases at the rate of four 
percent each year. He contributes 10 percent of his salary each month. 
Our hypothetical worker decides to put half of each month’s contribution into a regular 
investment account and the other half into an assurance fund account (i.e., 5 percent of his salary 
into each), directing both contributions into the same underlying global equity fund. If he dies 
before age 65, he would forfeit the balance in his assurance fund account, while the balance in his 
regular investment account would go to his designated beneficiaries. 
In this example, the assurance fund makes forfeiture redistributions based on the 2012 
Individual Annuity Mortality (IAM) Basic Table (Society of Actuaries 2020). Mortality credits are 
allocated each year by multiplying the account balance of each member who survived the year by 
a ‘mortality yield’ that accounts for the fair redistribution of forfeited account balances from those 
who died during the year to those who survived the year.11 
Table 1 shows how the balance of each of his two accounts would grow each year with the 
simplifying assumption that the rate of return on his investments is always seven percent each year 
and that members die and forfeit balances at exactly the rate predicted by the mortality table. 
Column 1 shows the worker’s age, and column 2 shows his salary—starting at $50,000 when he 
is 35 years old and growing by four percent a year until it reaches $155,933 when he is 64. Columns 
3 through 5 show how his regular investment account grows over the course of his working years. 
Column 3 shows his contribution amounts; column 4 shows the amount of his investment returns; 
and column 5 shows how the balance in his regular investment account would grow to $376,598 
by the end of the year that he turns 64.12 
[Table 1 here] 
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Columns 6 through 9 show how the same contributions would grow in an assurance fund 
account. Column 6 shows that his contributions to the assurance fund account are the same as his 
contributions to his regular investment account (i.e., 5 percent of salary into each account). Column 
8 shows his share of the mortality credits that surviving workers earn when other workers in the 
assurance fund die.13 These mortality credits grow over time, not only because the account balance 
is growing, but also because the worker’s death probability upon which they are based grows with 
age. Column 7 shows the higher investment returns that the assurance fund earns because those 
investment returns would be based on account balances that include those mortality credits. 
Finally, column 9 shows how the balance in our hypothetical worker’s assurance fund account 
would grow to $403,072 by the end of the year that he turns 64. 
All in all, Table 1 shows that while an equal amount is contributed to each account each 
year, when our hypothetical worker reaches retirement at age 65, his regular investment account 
balance will be just $376,598, while his assurance fund account balance will be $403,372 (7.1 
percent higher) as a result of accumulating and reinvesting the mortality credits attributable to the 
deaths of workers who did not live to age 65. 
Table 2 follows this worker’s assurance fund account after he retires at age 65, assuming 
that he elects a uniform (non-escalating) payout option. Of course, the payouts will stop when he 
dies, so the example illustrates the case of a long-living participant who lives to age 120. The 
payouts are computed as a life annuity using the simple formula 𝑠𝑠 ⁄ ?̈?𝑎, where 𝑠𝑠 is his balance at 
the start of the year, and ?̈?𝑎 is his current ‘annuity factor.’ This annuity factor represents the 
expected present value of $1 paid at the start of this year and every subsequent year for the duration 
of his lifetime, with future payments discounted to the present using an assumed annual interest 
rate.14 The assumed annual interest rate is computed as (1 + r) / (1 + g) – 1, where r is the expected 
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rate of return on the investor’s portfolio and g is the selected payout growth rate. In this example, 
r is seven percent and g is zero, so the assumed annual interest rate is seven percent. This 
calculation ensures that the present value of the future payouts will equal the present value of the 
account, and thereby be sustainable for as long as the investor lives.15 If it happens that the 
investments earn exactly seven percent in every subsequent year and that members die and forfeit 
balances at exactly the rate predicted by the mortality table, the investor’s payout will have the 
same value 𝑠𝑠 ⁄ ?̈?𝑎 every year until it is finally exhausted at age 120. 
[Table 2 here] 
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the age of our hypothetical retiree, and column 2 shows the 
balance in his account at the beginning of each year. Column 3 shows that, having elected the 
uniform payout option, he can expect to receive a level payout of $36,264 a year from age 65 until 
he dies at age 120. Column 4 shows his investment returns each year; column 5 shows his mortality 
credits each year; and column 6 shows how the ending balance of his account will fall from 
$396,376 at the end of the year that he turns 65 to $36,264 at the end of the year that he turns 119 
and to $0 at age 120. In passing, it is worth noting that mortality credit yields are relatively small 
early in a worker’s career but tend to grow steadily with age to the modest level of nearly one 
percent per year at retirement, and eventually growing very large at advanced ages—to over 13 
percent per year at age 90 and over 40 percent per year at age 100 (a bit less for women than for 
men, since women generally have lower death probabilities at each age). 
Similarly, Table 3 shows what the payouts would be if our hypothetical retiree had instead 
elected escalating payouts based on a 2.5 percent per year growth rate (modestly approximating 
an inflation-adjusted annuity). In this case, the assumed annual interest rate used to calculate the 
annuity factor is (1 + r) / (1 + g) – 1 = (1 + 0.07) / (1 + 0.025) – 1 ≈ 4.39 percent. As before, this 
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calculation ensures that present value of the future payouts will equal the present value of the 
account—i.e., the payouts are fully funded and sustainable for life. Column 3 of Table 3 shows 
how his payouts would increase by 2.5 percent a year from $29,195 at age 65 to $113,534 at age 
120. 
[Table 3 here] 
Table 4 illustrates the case in which a retiree starts with the same $403,372 balance at age 
65 and tries to withdraw the same level of payouts as in column 3 of Table 2 (uniform payouts 
from an assurance fund account), but this time makes those withdrawals from a regular investment 
account. With a regular investment account, withdrawals must stop when the account balance goes 
to zero, which in this case occurs at age 84. Unfortunately, age 84 is only around the median age 
of death that a 65-year-old male retiree could expect—in other words, there is a substantial chance 
that he would outlive the assets in his regular investment account. Similarly, although not shown 
here, we found that if a retiree instead tried to withdraw the same level of payouts as in column 3 
of Table 3 (escalating payouts from an assurance fund account) from his regular investment 
account, that regular investment account would be depleted at age 85. 
[Table 4 here] 
Of course, future investment returns will not be exactly seven percent each year, and future 
mortality experience will not follow the mortality table exactly. Thus, future payouts from an 
assurance fund account would not actually be constant but rather would vary. For equity 
investments, this payout variability would be significant due to the high volatility associated with 
equity investments. For more conservative portfolios, payout variability would naturally be 
smaller. In the next section, we develop a model to simulate more realistically the effects of 
investment volatility and mortality variability on assurance fund payout volatility. 




A More Realistic Illustration 
To examine the potential range and volatility of investor payouts, we model a set of 
assurance funds using Monte Carlo simulations of investment returns and member deaths. Because 
our goal is to focus on payout volatility, we focus on members that are old enough to be receiving 
payouts (i.e., retirees). 
We simulate an assurance fund pool of 10,000 assurance fund pool members. The size of 
the membership pool has a direct effect on the volatility of the mortality credits that members will 
receive. This volatility decreases (increases) as the size of the membership pool increases 
(decreases), but mortality experience is usually quite close to expectations with a pool that has at 
least 5,000 members (Sabin and Forman 2016). This is simply the law of large numbers at work 
in diversifying the idiosyncratic mortality risk of the individuals in the pool. To aid in decomposing 
the contribution to payout volatility between investment return and mortality experience (as 
opposed to membership pool size), we hold the pool size steady by assuming that one new member 
joins each year for every member that died the previous year. 
We assume that the assurance fund pool is mature, meaning that it has been operating long 
enough to have many members who are old enough to be receiving payouts. At the time our 
simulation begins, some members are about to receive their first payout, while others will have 
already been receiving payouts for many years. To model this maturity, we randomly assign each 
member an age, gender, investment portfolio, account balance, and age of death. 
Ages are assigned in the range from 65 to 85, inclusive. Investment portfolios are assigned 
as a choice between equity and bond portfolios. The equity portfolio has an expected return of 
seven percent and volatility of 17 percent, and the bond portfolio has expected return of three 
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percent and volatility of four percent.16 For simplicity, we assume no correlation between these 
portfolios. As a result, an allocation weighted, for example, 50 percent to the equity portfolio and 
50 percent to the bond portfolio has an expected return of five percent and volatility of 8.73 
percent.17 
Account balances range from approximately $63,000 to $1,000,000 and are selected 
according to a log-uniform distribution that results in relatively smaller initial balances for most 
members.18 Roughly one-third of initial balances are less than $158,000, and roughly two-thirds 
are less than $400,000. Only a small fraction of members have balances near $1,000,000. 
We note that except for the size of the pool, none of the other parameter values discussed 
above will have a material effect on our results. This lack of material effects is a feature of 
actuarially-fair tontine (or pooled annuity) designs: because the design is fair, payouts to any given 
member are largely unaffected by the ages, genders, investment amounts, and portfolio selections 
of the other members. 
Times of death are modeled using the 2012 IAM mortality table—this time using projection 
scale G2 (Society of Actuaries 2020) to account for expected mortality improvement.19 This table 
is also used to fairly redistribute forfeited account balances in the form of mortality credits from 
those who die to those who are still alive. The IAM mortality table with projection scale is a 
generational table, meaning that an individual’s probability of death depends not only on age and 
gender, but also on year of birth. The table projects decreasing probability of death (i.e., a longer 
life) as the birth year increases. 
Payouts are in the form of a life annuity that commences at age 65. We randomly assign a 
payout trajectory for each member, whether level/uniform or escalating at 2.5 percent per year.20 
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To fairly redistribute forfeitures when members die, we use the ‘nominal-gain method’ of 
tontine accounting described in Sabin and Forman (2016).21 We performed 10,000 simulation runs, 
with each run spanning 56 years, which is long enough to ensure that everyone who is taking 
payouts at the start of the simulation will have reached the maximum age of mortality (i.e., age 
120) by the end of the simulation. In each simulation run, random portfolio returns were generated 
for each of the 56 years and random years of death were generated for each member. 
 
Payouts and Payout Volatility 
Consider two 65-year-old men who each have $100,000 in their assurance fund accounts 
at the start of the year and who each elect to receive uniform payouts in retirement. Edgar invests 
in the equity portfolio, and he receives an $8,646 payout at the start of the year.22 Brian invests in 
the bond portfolio and receives a $5,970 payout at the start of the year (only about 69 percent of 
what Edgar receives). This difference is entirely attributable to the assumed annual interest rates 
used in their respective annuity factor calculations—seven percent for Edgar and three percent for 
Brian, matching the expected returns on their respective portfolios. As illustrated previously in 
Table 2, the expected payout in subsequent years for each investor will be the same as the payout 
in the initial year. These payouts will vary from year to year, but the expected value around which 
they vary will be uniform through time. 
The volatility of assurance fund payouts is primarily a function of two factors—the 
investment strategy (which affects investment return volatility) and the size of the membership 
pool (which affects mortality credit volatility). Assuming the membership pool is reasonably large, 
say at least 1,000 people, payout volatility will depend almost entirely on the investment strategy 
(Sabin and Forman 2016). 
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Mortality risk contribution. Recall that while risk pooling effectively diversifies idiosyncratic 
mortality/longevity risk, it does not eliminate it. Figure 1 illustrates the contribution to payout 
volatility that derives solely from undiversified idiosyncratic mortality risk. In other words, it 
illustrates what the range in payout levels would be if a member were to receive exactly the 
expected rate of return of their selected portfolio each year, with zero portfolio return volatility.23 
Note that because the tontine is fair by design, the effect of mortality risk on a member’s 
payouts will be the same regardless of which investment is selected: equity, bonds, cash, or any 
combination of these. For this reason, Figure 1 shows the normalized payout each year expressed 
as a percentage of the initial year payout, which will apply to both Edgar and Brian. In other words, 
Figure 1 shows the potential percent change in payouts from that results from random variations 
in mortality rates among the membership from year to year.  
[Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows these percent-change in payout values at the mean and at the 90th and 10th 
percentiles. The range of outcomes shown would be even narrower if the membership pool size 
were larger, because larger pools result in even greater diversification of the idiosyncratic risk.24 
Notice that the mean of the payout simulations in each year is almost perfectly uniform. 
This is a feature of the fairness principle and conveys that our model is well behaved. In addition, 
the deviation about the mean is largely symmetrical and growing with age—it is small and barely 
noticeable until about age 85 and then grows more noticeably after that. The reason for this is that 
the mortality credit is a function of the member’s probability of death, which increases with age.25 
The range between the 10th and 90th percentile of outcomes is less than one percent at age 80, two 
percent at age 90, 10 percent at age 100, and 22 percent at age 110. 
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Note, however, that some of the year-to-year variation will ‘cancel out’ over time, because 
deaths will be somewhat higher than expected in some years and somewhat lower than expected 
in other years simply by random chance. The distribution of the cumulative average payout values 
will therefore be tighter than that of the year-to-year payout values. 
Investment risk contribution. Next, we show the effect on payout variability when portfolio 
returns are also volatile, meaning the complete simulation that includes both sources of payout 
variability—the mortality credits and the investment returns. 
Figure 2 shows the results for Brian with the bond portfolio. Payouts start at $5,970 at age 
65 and gradually grow more volatile over time. By age 90, there is a 10 percent chance that his 
payout that year would be less than $4,547 and a 10 percent chance that it would be more than 
$7,553. 
[Figure 2 here] 
Figure 3 shows the even larger volatility for Edgar with his equity portfolio. Payouts start 
at $8,646 at age 65 and grow more volatile over time. By age 90, there is a 10 percent chance that 
his payout that year would be less than $2,167 and a 10 percent chance that it would be more than 
$17,666. In both Figure 2 and Figure 3, we see that the means of the payout simulations are almost 
perfectly uniform and that the deviation about those means (i.e., the payout volatility) is largely 
symmetrical. Again, this is expected of a fairly designed tontine. 
[Figure 3 here] 
The fact that Brian, the bond investor, receives only $5,970 in the first year, whereas Edgar, 
the equity investor, receives $8,646 might seem like a great reason to invest in equity. Perhaps so, 
but equity is a much riskier investment and thus there is a tradeoff decision to be made between 
risk and reward. While Edgar is likely to continue receiving higher payouts than Brian throughout 
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his retirement, there is a chance that he might not, and in the scenario of a severe bear market—
which could occur at any time—his payouts could drop significantly below those of Brian. 
Naturally, those invested in a blended allocation of equity and bonds would receive initial payouts 
that are between those of an all-equity or all-bond investor, and the volatility of their payouts 
would likewise be between those of an all-equity or all-bond investor.26 
To reiterate, the potential for lower payouts is not unique to assurance funds. To keep 
payouts or withdrawals at high levels in the face of portfolio losses is an exercise fraught with 
peril. Assurance funds avoid such peril by automatically making the adjustments necessary 
(whether up or down) to remain fully funded, thereby maximizing payouts without risking ruin. 
 
The Risk of Ruin 
For those taking systematic withdrawals from a retirement portfolio, risk is commonly 
measured as the risk of ruin, referring to the risk that the participant outlives her retirement 
savings—as happened to the investor in Table 4 above. Assurance funds are designed to have a 
virtually zero risk of ruin before the maximum age of mortality (age 120 in our model). This is 
accomplished through strict adherence to the budget constraint, which ensures that the expected 
present value of the payouts is always equal to the present value of the fund’s assets. 
The risk of ruin is principally a function of an investor’s age, spending rate, and investment 
returns. The so-called ‘four percent rule’ of Bengen (1994) has become a common rule-of-thumb 
in financial planning as the maximum ‘safe’ withdrawal rate for new retirees. The idea is that 
investors are likely to avoid ruin over a 30-year planning horizon when invested in a portfolio 
consisting of 50 percent equity and 50 percent bonds if they withdraw four percent of the portfolio 
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in the first year of retirement and then adjust that amount for inflation in each subsequent year, 
which we assume to be 2.5 percent per year. 
Figure 4 shows the risk of ruin for a regular investment account using this rule for three 
different investment portfolios used in our simulation. The portfolios are the equity portfolio, the 
bond portfolio, and a portfolio weighted 50 percent to equity and 50 percent to bonds. The plot 
shows the cumulative probability of ruin under each portfolio and compares these ruin probabilities 
with that of an assurance fund. For example, for a regular account invested 100 percent in bonds, 
there is a 10 percent chance of running out of money around age 86 and a 50 percent chance of 
running out of money around age 90. 
[Figure 4 here] 
Using the returns in our model, the three portfolios held in a regular investment account all 
begin to exhibit a material risk of ruin by age 85 when following the four percent rule. More risky 
portfolios begin to face the risk of ruin sooner due to their higher volatility but also have the 
potential to last longer due to their higher expected returns. A regular investment account invested 
in any of the three portfolios would have at least a 30 percent chance of ruin by age 93. 
In contrast, assurance funds have zero chance of ruin before age 120 regardless of how 
they are invested, and they always make a full payout at age 120 with the remaining money left in 
the investor’s account. Moreover, for any of these portfolios held in an assurance fund account, an 
investor who elects to receive payouts with the 2.5 percent annual growth option will enjoy higher 
payouts every year than an investor would receive by applying the four percent rule and investing 
in the same portfolio in a regular investment account. The tradeoff, of course, is that the assurance 
fund does not allow the investor to freely make any additional withdrawals nor leave any bequests 
at death. 




Using Escalating Payouts to Reduce Downside Payout Risk 
An examination of Figure 2 shows that even bond portfolios can result in meaningful 
payout volatility. The risk of falling payouts are concerning to many retirees, especially those who 
must rely heavily on their DC plan savings to pay for living expenses in retirement. 
When the payout growth rate used to compute an investor’s payout is set equal to zero (as 
is the case with a uniform payout), there will be about a 50-50 chance that any future payout will 
be either above or below the initial payout received in the first year. This downside risk can be 
mitigated by instead selecting an escalating payout method. Doing so reduces the initial payout, 
but also reduces the risk that future payouts will fall below the level of prior payouts. 
Figure 5 illustrates this by showing the payout on Brian’s bond portfolio if he had instead 
selected his payout to include a 2.5 percent per year growth rate. The plot confirms that the payout 
does indeed increase by 2.5 percent per year, on average. In addition, the 10th percentile curve 
reveals that the risk that future payouts will drop below the initial payout is significantly reduced 
compared to the uniform payout option shown in Figure 2. The initial payout drops from $5,970 
in the case of uniform payouts to $4,462 in the case of escalating payouts, but the growing payouts 
are expected to surpass the uniform payout level by age 77. Notably, even the 4.462 percent initial 
payout rate for the escalating-payout assurance fund is greater than what an investor could get by 
applying the four percent rule to a regular investment account, and the assurance fund comes with 
no risk of ruin before age 120. 
[Figure 5 here] 
These beneficial effects of using a positive payout growth rate would also hold for 
assurance funds that use riskier investment portfolios. For example, Figure 6 shows the payout to 
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a 65-year-old male using a portfolio allocated 50 percent to equity and 50 percent to bonds, using 
a 2.5 percent per year payout growth rate. In this case, the initial annual payout would be $5,655 
(5.655 percent), considerably higher than what an investor could get from applying the four percent 
rule to a regular investment account—and, again, with no risk of ruin before age 120. 
[Figure 6 here] 
Of course, there is another very good reason that people should want growing payout 
trajectories—inflation. Accordingly, state-sponsored assurance funds may want to encourage the 
use of escalating payout options. 
Note that using a positive payout growth rate by itself does not materially change the 
volatility of the payouts. It just shifts the payout distribution to be escalating rather than uniform, 




In the previous examples, the annual volatility of the payout stream as measured by the 
standard deviation of the payouts was 14.8 percent for the equity portfolio and 3.7 percent for the 
bond portfolio. What can be done for those that desire even less payout volatility? 
For one thing, states that offer assurance funds might include a portfolio option that uses 
cash-flow matching techniques, such as with bond ladders. In addition, plan participants could 
smooth plan payouts by keeping a portion of their retirement assets in a regular investment account 
and taking additional withdrawals from that regular investment account as needed to smooth their 
overall consumption. In this way, the regular investment account would act as a type of reserve 
mechanism. 
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Bond ladders. Cash-flow matching techniques, such as with Treasury bond ladders structured to 
produce a precise set of cash flows when held to maturity, could reduce payout volatility 
significantly. Although the market value of the bonds will vary as interest rates change over time, 
their cash flows will be unaffected. Furthermore, these cash flows would automatically adjust with 
inflation if the ladder was constructed using Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). 
It might seem a first glance that a laddering strategy would introduce reinvestment risk as 
the receipt of periodic mortality credits are reinvested into an investor’s account. Yet, it turns out 
that this reinvestment has no effect on the payouts. The reason is that the reinvested mortality 
credits increase the par value of each bond in the ladder by a factor that depends only on the 
realized mortality credit yield and not on the current market value of the bonds. Thus, payouts are 
immunized from interest rate risk (see Fullmer and Sabin 2019b). Such strategies may prove 
popular among those with a strong preference for payout stability. 
Side reserves. The whole idea of an assurance fund is to dispense with reserves in order to reduce 
costs, avoid counter-party risk, and maximize payouts. There is no reason, however, that an 
investor could not hold some assets in a regular investment account to dip into as needed or 
otherwise use for bequest motives. In fact, we expect that most assurance fund investors would do 
this. An assurance fund combined with a regular investment account provides both a source of 
assured lifetime income and a flexible asset reserve that can be used to smooth consumption in 
years that the assurance fund payouts fall and to fund unexpected spending needs from time to 
time. 
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Systematic Mortality Risk 
Our model incorporated idiosyncratic mortality risk, but not systematic mortality risk, 
which cannot be diversified away. This fact is highly significant to a DB plan sponsor or insurance 
company with liabilities that cover many persons. However, it is less significant to an individual 
person. To put it in perspective, an unexpected improvement in longevity might add a year or two 
or three to life expectancy over the course of a person’s retirement years. This will matter to the 
person only if she is fortunate enough to live into the right-hand tail of her age cohort. But even if 
she does, the effect of the systematic component is quite small compared to the idiosyncratic 
component. Absent any pooling, idiosyncratic longevity risk is remarkably high given that the 
remaining lifespan of a new retiree may be 10, 20, 30, 40 years or more. Thus, there is great benefit 
in cheaply diversifying this large idiosyncratic uncertainty away, and relatively little benefit in 
paying the more expensive cost to transfer the residual systematic risk to an insurer. 
That said, the issue of systematic mortality risk is important, and we do not mean to 
marginalize it. Unexpected macro improvements (or declines) in longevity would surely result in 
a downward (or upward) force on assurance fund payouts, and it is the members who bear this 
risk. An analytical discussion of systematic mortality risk is presented in Sabin and Forman (2016) 
and illustrated in the form of individual accounts (as would be the case of assurance funds) in 
Fullmer and Sabin (2019a). An interesting, and indeed useful, characteristic of assurance funds is 
that unexpected changes in macro longevity would be handled gradually and gracefully. The 
budget constraint forces the assurance fund to lower (or raise) payouts continually in response to 
actual member deaths from year to year. Should the membership systematically die more quickly 
or slowly than expected, payout changes would begin immediately to reflect that change. Thus, 
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payout changes due to systematic mortality risk will typically be small and gradual rather than 
large and lumpy. 
An exception lies in the case of sharp spikes in mortality rates that can occur, for example, 
in a time of pandemic such as the outbreak discovered in December 2019 of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2). If a pandemic were to cause the mortality rate 
within an assurance pool to increase unexpectedly, the mortality credits distributed to the surviving 
members would increase. As a result, payouts would also increase relative to what they would 
have been absent the pandemic. Essentially, a pandemic causes mortality credits—and thus 
payouts—to be pulled forward from future periods to the present. This unexpected ‘payout bump’ 
would likely be followed by a gradual payout dip in later years because those who died during the 
pandemic would, of course, not die later when they otherwise would have. If, however, the higher 
mortality rates caused by the pandemic were more permanent (i.e., resulted in a permanent 
reduction in life expectancies), the fund’s mortality tables would be adjusted accordingly, and 
payout rates would remain at the higher level. A cure for cancer, on the other hand, would have 
the opposite effects (i.e., increasing life expectancies and reducing annual payouts). 
People who prefer not to accept any amount of longevity risk could, of course, transfer that 
risk to an insurance company by purchasing a commercial life annuity rather than an assurance 
fund, although that risk transfer would naturally come at a cost. Because annuity providers bear 
systematic longevity risk, they are required to ensure their solvency by pricing in a suitable risk 
premium (NAIC 2013). Since assurance funds offer no such risk transfer or guarantee, no such 
risk premiums are charged. As a result, purchasers of commercial annuities sacrifice some amount 
of yield as the price for transferring the systematic component of longevity risk to the insurance 
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company (Warshawsky 2012; Fullmer and Sabin 2019a). Assurance fund members instead keep 
that yield for themselves. 
 
Conclusion 
Assurance funds can enhance defined contribution plans by providing retirees with 
universal access to pension-like lifetime income. This income would not be fixed, and it would not 
be guaranteed; rather, it would be variable and nonguaranteed. But by adhering to a strict budget 
constraint, these plans and the income that they provide would always be fully funded and, 
therefore, fully sustainable. 
Assurance funds are relatively simple. They payout out what they can—no more and no 
less—using simple, transparent formulas in a highly efficient way. Organized as either tontines or 
pooled annuities, payouts would be significantly higher, on average, than retirees could obtain 
from regular retirement savings accounts or comparable commercial life annuities. Moreover, if 
assurance fund accounts were offered along with regular investment accounts, together they would 
provide investors a sensible way to mitigate longevity risk, preserve liquidity, smooth 
consumption, and bequeath assets upon death. 
State retirement savings programs could partner with various private-sector investment and 
record-keeping companies to add assurance funds to their investment platforms as a way to 
transform their programs from simple retirement savings plans into true lifetime pension plans. 
Costs could be quite low, and, since assurance funds make no guarantees, the sponsors would bear 
no fiduciary due diligence risks associated with selecting a guarantor. Assurance funds may also 
be of interest outside the US as an efficient, low-cost way to provide access to assured lifetime 
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retirement income, perhaps especially in countries where a well-established insurance market does 
not currently exist. 
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1 Tontines are named after Lorenzo de Tonti, the 17th-century Italian who is credited with the idea 
(Milevsky 2015). Group self-annuitization (Piggott et al. 2005; Qiao and Sherris 2013) is a similar 
concept that could be used. Participating variable index-linked annuities (Maurer, et al. 2013a; 
Maurer, et al. 2013b) could also be used—provided that the participation applies fully on both the 
upside and the downside. This would exclude ‘one-way’ participating annuities that offer upside 
participation with downside protection. 
2 See Waring and Siegel (2018) for a discussion on the budget constraint as it relates to retirement 
spending. The budget constraint differentiates assurance funds from so-called ‘collective defined 
contribution’ (CDC) plans which may permit intergenerational wealth redistribution that can result 
in significant underfunding and unsustainability risks that we wish to avoid (see, e.g., Wilkenson 
2018). 
3 By this we mean efficient economically for individual retirement consumers; see the lifecycle 
model in Yaari (1965), for example. 
4 We use the terms ‘member’ and ‘investor’ somewhat interchangeably when referring to those 
that invest in an assurance fund. In general, we use the term investor when referring to concepts 
that apply generally to any investor, and we use the term member when referring to concepts that 
apply to risk pooling, risk sharing, forfeitures, and other concepts that do not apply to regular 
investment accounts. 
5 We use the term ‘mutual fund’ generically to include similar offerings such as collective 
investment trusts. Assurance funds might likewise be organized as either funds or trusts. 
6 See, for example, Warshawsky (2012) who notes that commercial life annuities typically provide 









comparison of expected assurance fund performance relative to fixed annuities is significantly 
more nuanced. The same rational—that assurance funds dispense with the risk costs required of 
commercial life annuities—still applies, but we note that a theoretical comparison using historical 
fixed annuity prices in Canada by Milevsky et al. (2018) was not so clear-cut. That study found 
that the comparison results depended significantly on the assumptions used. 
7 Similar arrangements go by other names, including participating annuities and group-self 
annuitization schemes (Piggott et al. 2005; Qiao and Sherris 2013; Maurer, et al. 2013a; Maurer, 
et al. 2013b). 
8 Moreover, these accounts could be used to automatically combine each worker’s past pensions 
into a single account, which could help to reduce leakage and preserve retirement savings for 
retirement purposes (Croce 2019; Retirement Clearinghouse 2020). 
9 Self-employed workers would also be allowed to participate in these state-sponsored pensions, 
if they desired. For that matter, it might make sense to allow anyone who can legally open or own 
an IRA to participate. 
10 States might even automatically default a portion of each worker’s contributions into an 
assurance fund but allow the worker to opt out. We view this approach as unlikely in the United 
States, where a default into any type of irrevocable, annuity-like option would certainly be 
controversial. On the other hand, in countries where government-mandated actions are more 
commonplace, it could be appropriate to automatically default a portion of each worker’s 
contributions into an assurance fund (either with, or without, an opt-out). 
11 We illustrate yearly mortality rates and payout amounts here for brevity, but the same principle 
applies when using monthly rates and payouts. Also, we are not advocating that assurance funds 
should take gender into account but only noting that they could. For more discussion of gender 
 





issues in annuities and pensions, see Forman and Sabin (2015). 
12 The monthly rate of return 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 is computed as 1.07(1/12) − 1. The monthly investment return is 
calculated as the beginning of period balance multiplied by 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 plus the current month’s 
contribution multiplied by (1 +  𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚)1/2 –  1. 
13 These mortality credits are calculated by taking the beginning of period balance and adding the 
monthly investment return, then multiplying this sum by the mortality credit yield. 
14 The formula for the annuity factor at age 𝑥𝑥 is ?̈?𝑎𝑥𝑥 = 1 + ∑  𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥∞𝑡𝑡=1 , where 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 is the probability 
of surviving to age 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑡𝑡 given that the member is alive at age 𝑥𝑥, and 𝑣𝑣 = 1 (1 + 𝑖𝑖)⁄  is the discount 
factor, with 𝑖𝑖 the assumed interest rate (e.g., 7 percent). The value of 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 is calculated from the 
mortality table. The IAM mortality table used here has a terminal age of 120, meaning there is zero 
probability of surviving to ages greater than 120, and so the sum in the formula has a finite number 
of terms. In practice, an assurance fund provider could extend the table to even more advanced 
ages to accommodate the possibility of even longer lives. 
15 At least until the maximum age of the mortality table, which is 120 in this case. 
16 We assume that the returns on both portfolios are random and normally distributed. The reason 
is that we are not trying to model specific equity or bond portfolios, but rather depict portfolios 
with higher/lower returns and higher/lower return volatility. In a later section, we briefly discuss 
the potential of other investment strategies with different return characteristics. 
17 The expected return on a blended portfolio is 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 + 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏, where 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 is the weight in the equity 
portfolio, 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 is the expected return of the equity portfolio, 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 is the weight in the bond portfolio, 
and 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 is the expected return of the bond portfolio. Because we assume no correlation between 
portfolios, the volatility is simply (𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒2𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏2𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏2)1/2, where 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒 is the volatility of the equity 
portfolio and 𝜎𝜎𝑏𝑏 is the volatility of the bond portfolio. 
 





18 Specifically, balances are assigned by the formula 10(1.2U+4.8), where U is a uniform random 
number in the range of zero to one. 
19 With respect to mortality improvement projection, the first year of the simulation is assumed to 
be 2020 and the last year of the simulation is 2075. 
20 For level/uniform payouts, the assumed annual interest rate is seven percent for the equity 
portfolio and three percent for the bond portfolio. For escalating payouts, the assumed annual 
interest rate is (1 + r) / (1 + g) – 1 = (1 + 0.07) / (1 + 0.025) – 1 ≈ 4.39 percent for the equity 
portfolio and (1 + r) / (1 + g) – 1 = (1 + 0.03) / (1 + 0.025) – 1 ≈ 0.49 percent for the bond portfolio. 
The assumed annual interest rate for blended portfolios are computed similarly using the expected 
rate of return on the blended portfolio (refer to endnote 17) in the numerator of this calculation. 
21 As explained in Sabin and Forman (2016), the nominal-gain method is not strictly fair in an 
actuarial sense, at least not exactly. The analysis is complicated, but for our purposes the bottom 
line is that its bias is negligible in an assurance fund pool of the size described here (i.e., with 
10,000 members). For all practical purposes, we can use the nominal-gain method and regard it as 
fair. We choose this method for its advantages of simplicity, transparency, and the fact that 
members will perceive it as being fair. 
22 Note that Edgar’s age 65 payout rate of 8.646 percent of the portfolio value in the first year is 
less than the 8.990 percent payout rate at the same age given in Table 2 (0.08990 = $36,264 / 
$403,372). The reason is that Table 2 illustrated a simple example that assumed no mortality 
improvement, whereas our simulation model does assume mortality improvement. 
23 At its simplest, imagine a fund that takes investor money and simply holds it, with zero return 
and zero volatility (in this case, a 65-year-old male investing $100,000 and selecting the uniform 
payout option would receive $4,183 in the first year and expect to continue receiving that amount 
 





every year thereafter). 
24 For an analytical discussion of this effect, see Sabin and Forman (2016). 
25 The expected mortality credit yield at age x is qx / (1 – qx), where qx is the death probability at 
age x. Since qx increases with age, so too does the expected mortality credit yield. This amplifies 
the effect of random mortality deviations on the actual mortality credit yield, resulting in increasing 
deviation of the percentile curves at higher ages. 
26 Recall that Figures 2 and 3 (as well as Figures 1, 5, and 6) show the range in payouts from year-
to-year, and in any particular simulation the payouts both rise and fall over the course of the payout 
years. These ups and downs ‘average out’ over time such that the range of the average payout 




Figure 1. Range of yearly payouts by age (male) due to mortality credit volatility only 
  


























Figure 2. Range of yearly payouts by age (male) due to both mortality credit and investment 
volatility (bond portfolio with no payout growth rate) 
 
























Figure 3. Range of yearly payouts by age (male) due to both mortality credit and investment 
volatility (equity portfolio with no payout growth rate) 
 



















Figure 4. Cumulative probability of ruin for regular investment accounts under the four percent 
rule, compared to assurance fund accounts 
 
































Figure 5. Range of yearly payouts by age (male) due to both mortality credit and investment 
volatility (bond portfolio with a 2.5 percent per year payout growth rate) 
 




















Figure 6: Range of yearly payouts by age (male) due to both mortality credit and investment 
volatility (50/50 equity/bond allocation with a 2.5 percent per year payout growth rate) 
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Table 1. Account balances before retirement 
  Regular Investment Account  Assurance Fund Account 











35 $50,000 $2,500 $86 $2,586  $2,500 $86 $2 $2,588 
36 52,000 2,600 270 5,457  2,600 271 4 5,463 
37 54,080 2,704 475 8,635  2,704 475 7 8,649 
38 56,243 2,812 701 12,149  2,812 702 10 12,174 
39 58,493 2,925 951 16,025  2,925 953 14 16,066 
40 60,833 3,042 1,226 20,293  3,042 1,229 19 20,356 
41 63,266 3,163 1,529 24,985  3,163 1,534 26 25,079 
42 65,797 3,290 1,862 30,137  3,290 1,869 34 30,271 
43 68,428 3,421 2,227 35,786  3,421 2,237 43 35,972 
44 71,166 3,558 2,627 41,972  3,558 2,640 54 42,224 
45 74,012 3,701 3,065 48,738  3,701 3,083 66 49,074 
46 76,973 3,849 3,544 56,130  3,849 3,568 83 56,573 
47 80,052 4,003 4,067 64,200  4,003 4,098 105 64,778 
48 83,254 4,163 4,637 73,000  4,163 4,678 133 73,752 
49 86,584 4,329 5,259 82,588  4,329 5,312 170 83,563 
50 90,047 4,502 5,936 93,026  4,502 6,004 215 94,285 
51 93,649 4,682 6,673 104,382  4,682 6,761 271 105,999 
52 97,395 4,870 7,474 116,726  4,870 7,588 336 118,793 
53 101,291 5,065 8,345 130,135  5,065 8,490 410 132,757 
54 105,342 5,267 9,291 144,693  5,267 9,474 495 147,993 
55 109,556 5,478 10,317 160,488  5,478 10,548 595 164,614 
56 113,938 5,697 11,430 177,615  5,697 11,719 717 182,747 
57 118,496 5,925 12,637 196,177  5,925 12,996 865 202,533 
58 123,236 6,162 13,944 216,283  6,162 14,389 1,049 224,133 
59 128,165 6,408 15,360 238,051  6,408 15,910 1,275 247,726 
60 133,292 6,665 16,893 261,609  6,665 17,570 1,549 273,510 
61 138,623 6,931 18,551 287,091  6,931 19,384 1,882 301,707 
62 144,168 7,208 20,344 314,644  7,208 21,367 2,279 332,562 
63 149,935 7,497 22,283 344,424  7,497 23,537 2,751 366,347 





 $140,212 $244,385 $18,775 
 
 
Note: For simplicity, this exhibit uses mortality rates without mortality improvements. 














65 $403,372 $36,264 $25,698 $3,570 $396,376 
66 396,376 36,264 25,208 3,694 389,014 
67 389,014 36,264 24,693 3,845 381,288 
68 381,288 36,264 24,152 4,026 373,201 
69 373,201 36,264 23,586 4,240 364,763 
70 364,763 36,264 22,995 4,492 355,987 
71 355,987 36,264 22,381 4,786 346,890 
72 346,890 36,264 21,744 5,128 337,498 
73 337,498 36,264 21,086 5,519 327,839 
74 327,839 36,264 20,410 5,956 317,941 
75 317,941 36,264 19,717 6,435 307,830 
76 307,830 36,264 19,010 6,952 297,528 
77 297,528 36,264 18,288 7,508 287,060 
78 287,060 36,264 17,556 8,102 276,454 
79 276,454 36,264 16,813 8,732 265,734 
80 265,734 36,264 16,063 9,414 254,948 
81 254,948 36,264 15,308 10,183 244,174 
82 244,174 36,264 14,554 10,961 233,425 
83 233,425 36,264 13,801 11,739 222,702 
84 222,702 36,264 13,051 12,541 212,030 
85 212,030 36,264 12,304 13,399 201,468 
86 201,468 36,264 11,564 14,336 191,104 
87 191,104 36,264 10,839 15,356 181,034 
88 181,034 36,264 10,134 16,448 171,352 
89 171,352 36,264 9,456 17,588 162,132 
90 162,132 36,264 8,811 18,751 153,431 
91 153,431 36,264 8,202 19,868 145,236 
92 145,236 36,264 7,628 20,966 137,567 
93 137,567 36,264 7,091 22,056 130,450 
94 130,450 36,264 6,593 23,163 123,942 
95 123,942 36,264 6,137 24,317 118,132 
96 118,132 36,264 5,731 24,599 112,198 
97 112,198 36,264 5,315 25,463 106,713 
98 106,713 36,264 4,931 26,257 101,637 
99 101,637 36,264 4,576 26,963 96,912 
100 96,912 36,264 4,245 27,607 92,501 
101 92,501 36,264 3,937 28,789 88,963 
102 88,963 36,264 3,689 29,594 85,982 
103 85,982 36,264 3,480 30,530 83,728 
104 83,728 36,264 3,322 31,764 82,551 
105 82,551 36,264 3,240 33,018 82,544 
106 82,544 36,264 3,240 33,013 82,533 
107 82,533 36,264 3,239 33,005 82,514 
52 
 
108 82,514 36,264 3,237 32,991 82,479 
109 82,479 36,264 3,235 32,966 82,416 
110 82,416 36,264 3,231 32,922 82,305 
111 82,305 36,264 3,223 32,842 82,106 
112 82,106 36,264 3,209 32,701 81,751 
113 81,751 36,264 3,184 32,448 81,119 
114 81,119 36,264 3,140 31,997 79,992 
115 79,992 36,264 3,061 31,192 77,981 
116 77,981 36,264 2,920 29,758 74,396 
117 74,396 36,264 2,669 27,201 68,002 
118 68,002 36,264 2,222 22,640 56,599 
119 56,599 36,264 1,423 14,506 36,264 
120 36,264      36,264            0               0 0 
 
 
$2,030,783 $578,571 $1,048,840 
 
 
Note: For simplicity, this exhibit uses mortality rates without mortality improvements. 














65 $403,372 $29,195 $26,192 $3,639 $404,008 
66 404,008 29,925 26,186 3,838 404,107 
67 404,107 30,673 26,140 4,071 403,644 
68 403,644 31,440 26,054 4,343 402,601 
69 402,601 32,226 25,926 4,661 400,963 
70 400,963 33,032 25,755 5,031 398,717 
71 398,717 33,858 25,540 5,462 395,862 
72 395,862 34,704 25,281 5,963 392,402 
73 392,402 35,572 24,978 6,537 388,346 
74 388,346 36,461 24,632 7,188 383,705 
75 383,705 37,372 24,243 7,912 378,488 
76 378,488 38,307 23,813 8,709 372,703 
77 372,703 39,264 23,341 9,582 366,361 
78 366,361 40,246 22,828 10,535 359,478 
79 359,478 41,252 22,276 11,568 352,070 
80 352,070 42,283 21,685 12,710 344,181 
81 344,181 43,341 21,059 14,008 335,908 
82 335,908 44,424 20,404 15,367 327,255 
83 327,255 45,535 19,720 16,774 318,214 
84 318,214 46,673 19,008 18,266 308,815 
85 308,815 47,840 18,268 19,894 299,138 
86 299,138 49,036 17,507 21,703 289,311 
87 289,311 50,262 16,733 23,707 279,490 
88 279,490 51,518 15,958 25,900 269,830 
89 269,830 52,806 15,192 28,257 260,472 
90 260,472 54,126 14,444 30,741 251,531 
91 251,531 55,480 13,724 33,245 243,020 
92 243,020 56,867 13,031 35,816 235,000 
93 235,000 58,288 12,370 38,475 227,556 
94 227,556 59,745 11,747 41,268 220,826 
95 220,826 61,239 11,171 44,260 215,018 
96 215,018 62,770 10,657 45,746 208,652 
97 208,652 64,339 10,102 48,392 202,806 
98 202,806 65,948 9,580 51,009 197,447 
99 197,447 67,596 9,090 53,556 192,497 
100 192,497 69,286 8,625 56,085 187,920 
101 187,920 71,019 8,183 59,845 184,930 
102 184,930 72,794 7,850 62,973 182,958 
103 182,958 74,614 7,584 66,531 182,459 
104 182,459 76,479 7,419 70,924 184,322 
105 184,322 78,391 7,415 75,564 188,911 
106 188,911 80,351 7,599 77,439 193,598 
107 193,598 82,360 7,787 79,350 198,375 
54 
 
108 198,375 84,419 7,977 81,289 203,222 
109 203,222 86,529 8,168 83,241 208,102 
110 208,102 88,692 8,359 85,179 212,947 
111 212,947 90,910 8,543 87,053 217,632 
112 217,632 93,182 8,711 88,774 221,936 
113 221,936 95,512 8,850 90,182 225,455 
114 225,455 97,900 8,929 90,989 227,474 
115 227,474 100,347 8,899 90,683 226,709 
116 226,709 102,856 8,670 88,348 220,871 
117 220,871 105,427 8,081 82,349 205,873 
118 205,873 108,063 6,847 69,771 174,429 
119 174,429 110,765 4,456 45,414 113,534 
120 113,534    113,534            0               0 0 
 
 
$3,487,075 $833,586 $2,250,117 
 
 
Note: For simplicity, this exhibit uses mortality rates without mortality improvements. 









Return Ending Balance 
65 $403,372 $36,264 $25,698 $392,806 
66 392,806 36,264 24,958 381,500 
67 381,500 36,264 24,166 369,402 
68 369,402 36,264 23,320 356,458 
69 356,458 36,264 22,414 342,607 
70 342,607 36,264 21,444 327,787 
71 327,787 36,264 20,407 311,930 
72 311,930 36,264 19,297 294,963 
73 294,963 36,264 18,109 276,808 
74 276,808 36,264 16,838 257,382 
75 257,382 36,264 15,478 236,596 
76 236,596 36,264 14,023 214,355 
77 214,355 36,264 12,466 190,558 
78 190,558 36,264 10,801 165,094 
79 165,094 36,264 9,018 137,848 
80 137,848 36,264 7,111 108,695 
81 108,695 36,264 5,070 77,501 
82 77,501 36,264 2,887 44,124 
83 44,124 36,264 550 8,410 
84 8,410     8,410            0 0 
 
 $697,426 $294,054  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
